Hillards takeover

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Letter and information from Ian MacLaurin Chairman of Tesco to shareholders of Hilards   page 3 of 6   previous   next

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    T H E I N V E S T O R S  C H R O N I C L E
        1st MAY,             1987




    Being a small grocer Isn't easy. Expansion costs a fortune and makes the company vuinerable to the site
    hungry         majors

                                                     Te s c o           c l o s e s   i n o n H l l l a r d s

    "Hillards      not for sale" are     the     brave words         on     the red   rosette of Mr     Peter   Hartley, chairman    of the Yorkshire
    grocer. Mr Hartley's defiance is unlikely to amount to much however. He has characterised Tesco's second
    offer      for Hillards     as a "derisory     discount", and             points      to the near     third  of the equity in    friendly  hands.
    Nevertheless, only a miracle will                            save Hillards now.
    Tesco's first                                             13 for 20 offer valued the Yorkshire grocer at £185m with Tesco at 496p, and might even
    have carried the day if only Hillards     hadn't                     come up with an unexpectedly               impressive         second profits
    forecast: a 45 per cent, increase to £15m before tax in 1987-8. (Just how good this would be is indicated
    by the fact that brokers Scrimgeour Vickers                                            doubt that this rate of growth could have been sustained.)
    The          second    offer, 14     for   19, and     seven     Tesco     shares     for 19    of  the recently     issued Hillards  Convertible
    Preference with a 342.6p cash alternative, means Hillards will cost Tesco £209m. That implies a prospective
    P E   r a t io   . . . . o f 2 1 o n t h e 1 9 8 7 - 8 e s t i m a t e .

                      Probably more important to Hillards' mainly        institutional     holders,     the bid    values         the shares at 365p,
    60 per cent, higher     than the price just                      before Tesco came in. The lacklustre                    performance of Hillards'
    shares over the last     twelve months suggests the grocer could inspire nothing so good on its own.
       It's   not    that       Hillards'  record is         awful.  Just   uninspiring.  And that      it  has  been    unable latterly to   put on
    extra     volume     in         older           supermarkets is  perceived     as worrying.
                                             Being a small supermarket chain, after all, isn't easy. The market has become increasingly concentrated
    in the hands of five majors over the last 10 years - Asda, Sainsbury, Argyll, Dee and of course Tesco. At
    the same time, grocery retailing has become a lot more sophisticated. And the best example of the changes
    just                                     happens to be Tesco's transformation since the late seventies. It reads like the food retailer's credo.
                                           From 722* stores in 1977, many small and dingy, Tesco has shrunk to a 337-strong chain. But selling space
    hasn't been reduced anything like as dramatically because 115 of Tesco's outlets are 25,000 square feet-plus
    superstores. The product range, overgrown and often organised locally just before the turn of the decade,
    was taken to the centre and rationalised. That paved the way for buying efficiencies, proper stock control
    and more centralised distribution. And for the introduction of a higher proportion of lucrative own label
    and    fresh     foods.     The     Chinese    lettuces     have     begun to         draw in   the    ABCIs too.
                                          After the plateau of the late seventies, Tesco's profits started creeping upwards as a result. From £42.7m
    before tax in the year to February 1982, they have climbed to the £169m before property gains announced
    last week, 38 per cent, higher than 1985-86. Turnover last year was £3.81bn (£3.56bn).
                                             Tesco has benefited from issues of equity and unsecured loan stock over the last two years. But the one
    percentage point increase in 1986-87 net margins .... capping 5 years of steady improvement, is not to be
    sniffed   at.    It's    a   tribute   to the massive  surgery       undertaken       by   chairman   Ian   MacLaurin.
   For the small chains to keep up with all that can be tricky, just like the majors, they have to open
    superstores        and     invest     in   computers     to      be     sure   of generating       growth    and  keeping   margins       moving
    upwards. But being smaller means the timing of investment and return has got to be just right if both the
    profit   and loss account and the balance sheet aren't to suffer.                               There is     little room for mistakes....
                 Not that     Hillards     has made some obvious mistake.                 Rather,   it trod too  cautiously in   the early eighties,
investing only £24.0mt in fixed assets in the three years to 1983-4, against £29.1m in the two subsequent
years. That kept profits moving ahead nicely until 1983-4. But rates of profits growth fell off after that.
Hillards didn't have enough new stores opening to counter competition in its Yorkshire heartland from the
majors.
  What's more, the grocer's relative slowness at developing new systems and introducing more own
    label      and   fresh     foods     meant    that     profits  per     square   foot and  cash     generation     never covered    the cost of
    expansion. The accelerated investment programme of recent years led to the £15.7m preference rights
    issue    in    February
                                              .... The attractions are obvious. The five major grocery retailers are rapidly covering the land with
    superstores, taking market share each year from the Co-ops and the independents. With a decade at most
    of expansion to go, the competition for suitable sites is                             intense.
                                            Buying Hillards' 15 odd superstores will plug a gap in Tesco's supermarket network. It will probably be
    cheaper, and certainly quicker, than for Tesco to set up from scratch. The takeover would imply a little
    pro forma earnings dilution. But Tesco reckons that the boost to sales per square foot that will follow the
    metamorphosis of Hillards into Tesco (only a three month job)                                   could even enhance earnings....


    •Tesco figures
    tHillards' accounts
THEINVESTORSCHRONICLE
1st MAY, 1987




Being a small grocer Isn't easy. Expansion costs a fortune and makes the company vuinerable to the site
hungry majors

Te scoclosesinonHlllards

"Hillards not for sale" are the brave words on the red rosette of Mr Peter Hartley, chairman of the Yorkshire
grocer. Mr Hartley's defiance is unlikely to amount to much however. He has characterised Tesco's second
offer for Hillards as a "derisory discount", and points to the near third of the equity in friendly hands.
Nevertheless, only a miracle will save Hillards now.
Tesco's first 13 for 20 offer valued the Yorkshire grocer at £185m with Tesco at 496p, and might even
have carried the day if only Hillards hadn't come up with an unexpectedly impressive second profits
forecast: a 45 per cent, increase to £15m before tax in 1987-8.(Just how good this would be is indicated
by the fact that brokers Scrimgeour Vickers doubt that this rate of growth could have been sustained.)
The second offer, 14 for 19, and seven Tesco shares for 19 of the recently issued Hillards Convertible
Preference with a 342.6p cash alternative, means Hillards will cost Tesco £209m. That implies a prospective
PErat io . . . . of21onthe1987 - 8estimate .

Probably more important to Hillards' mainly institutional holders, the bid values the shares at 365p,
60 per cent, higher than the price just before Tesco came in. The lacklustre performance of Hillards'
shares over the last twelve months suggests the grocer could inspire nothing so good on its own.
It's not that Hillards' record is awful. Just uninspiring. And that it has been unable latterly to put on
extra volume in older supermarkets is perceived as worrying.
Being a small supermarket chain, after all, isn't easy. The market has become increasingly concentrated
in the hands of five majors over the last 10 years - Asda, Sainsbury, Argyll, Dee and of course Tesco. At
the same time, grocery retailing has become a lot more sophisticated. And the best example of the changes
just happens to be Tesco's transformation since the late seventies. It reads like the food retailer's credo.
From722* stores in 1977,many small and dingy, Tesco has shrunk to a 337-strong chain. But selling space
hasn't been reduced anything like as dramatically because115 of Tesco's outlets are 25,000square feet-plus
superstores. The product range, overgrown and often organised locally just before the turn of the decade,
was taken to the centre and rationalised. That paved the way for buying efficiencies, proper stock control
and more centralised distribution. And for the introduction of a higher proportion of lucrative own label
and fresh foods. The Chinese lettuces have begun to draw in the ABCIs too.
After the plateau of the late seventies, Tesco's profits started creeping upwards as a result. From£42.7m
before tax in the year to February1982, they have climbed to the£169m before property gains announced
last week, 38 per cent, higher than1985-86. Turnover last year was £3.81bn (£3.56bn).
Tesco has benefited from issues of equity and unsecured loan stock over the last two years. But the one
percentage point increase in 1986-87 net margins.... capping 5 years of steady improvement, is not to be
sniffed at. It's a tribute to the massive surgery undertaken by chairman Ian MacLaurin.
For the small chains to keep up with all that can be tricky, just like the majors, they have to open
superstores and invest in computers to be sure of generating growth and keeping margins moving
upwards. But being smaller means the timing of investment and return has got to be just right if both the
profit and loss account and the balance sheet aren't to suffer. There is little room for mistakes....
Not that Hillards has made some obvious mistake. Rather, it trod too cautiously in the early eighties,
investing only £24.0mt in fixed assets in the three years to 1983-4,against £29.1m in the two subsequent
years. That kept profits moving ahead nicely until1983-4. But rates of profits growth fell off after that.
Hillards didn't have enough new stores opening to counter competition in its Yorkshire heartland from the
majors.
What's more, the grocer's relative slowness at developing new systems and introducing more own
label and fresh foods meant that profits per square foot and cash generation never covered the cost of
expansion. The accelerated investment programme of recent years led to the£15.7m preference rights
issue in February
.... The attractions are obvious. The five major grocery retailers are rapidly covering the land with
superstores, taking market share each year from the Co-ops and the independents. With a decade at most
of expansion togo, the competition for suitable sites is intense.
Buying Hillards' 15 odd superstores will plug a gap in Tesco's supermarket network. It will probably be
cheaper, and certainly quicker, than for Tesco to set up from scratch. The takeover would imply a little
proforma earnings dilution. But Tesco reckons that the boost to sales per square foot that will follow the
metamorphosis of Hillards into Tesco (only a three month job) could even enhance earnings....


•Tesco figures
tHillards' accounts

Read by machine

    THE INVESTORS CHRONICLE
    Ist MAY, 1987




 Being a small grocer isn’t easy. Expansion costs a fortune and makes the company vulnerable to the site
 hungry majors

                                        Tesco closes in               on     Hillards

 ‘Hillards not for sale” are the brave words on the red rosette of Mr Peter Hartley, chairman of the Yorkshire
 grocer. Mr Hartley’s defiance is unlikely to amount to much however. He has characterised Tesco’s second
    offer    for Hillards as a “derisory      discount’,  and points  to the    near third     of the equity  in friendly  hands.
    Nevertheless,     only a miracle will  save   Hillards now.
        Tesco’s first  13 for 20 offer valued the Yorkshire     grocer   at     £185m with Tesco     at 496p, and might      even
    have carried     the  day  if   only Hillards hadn’t   come up    with     an unexpectedly     impressive      second profits
    forecast:    a 45  per cent.    increase to £15m before tax in              1987-8. (Just how good this would be is indicated
    by the fact that     brokers Scrimgeour Vickers doubt that        this     rate         of growth could have been sustained.)
        The second offer,    14 for   19, and   seven    Tesco shares for          19 of the recently issued Hillards Convertible
    Preference with     a  342.6p cash alternative,   means    Hillards will  cost Tesco £209m.    That implies   a   prospective
    PE               of 21 on  the      1987-8 estimate.

        Probably     more  important to Hillards’ mainly     institutional            holders, the bid values the shares at 365p,
    60   per cent.    higher than the price just     before Tesco     came     in. The lacklustre        performance of Hillards’
shares over the last twelve months suggests the grocer could inspire nothing so good on its own.
        It’s not that  Hillards’    record is awful. Just  uninspiring. And that     it    has been unable latterly to put     on
    extra volume     in   older supermarkets is perceived     as      worrying.
        Being a  small supermarket chain, after all,     isn’t easy.              The market has become increasingly concentrated
    in  the hands of five majors      over the last  10   years - Asda, Sainsbury, Argyll,     Dee and of     course    Tesco. At
    the  same    time, grocery   retailing has become    a lot more            sophisticated. And the best example of the changes
    just happens     to be Tesco’s transformation since the late seventies.            It  reads like  the food retailer’s credo.
        From 722* stores in 1977,     many   small and dingy, Tesco has shrunk to          a  337-strong chain. But selling space
    hasn’t been reduced anything like     as    dramatically because 115 of Tesco’s outlets     are   25,000  square    feet-plus
    superstores.     The product      range, overgrown            and often organised locally just before the turn of the decade,
    was  taken   to   the centre    and rationalised. That paved      the way   for buying efficiencies, proper     stock control
    and  more    centralised distribution.   And for the introduction of     a     higher    proportion of lucrative own    label
    and fresh    foods.   The chinese lettuces have begun to draw in the                       too.

        After the plateau of the       late seventies, Tesco’s profits started creeping upwards     as  a result.    From £42.7m
    before   tax in   the year to   February 1982, they have climbed to the £169m before property                 gains announced
    last week, 38     per  cent.    higher than 1985-86. Turnover last           year was  £3.81bn  (£3.56bn).
        Tesco has benefited from issues of equity and unsecured loan stock                 over the last two years. But the  one
    percentage point     increase in  1986-87   net  margins   . . .  .  capping 5  years    of steady improvement, is not to be
    sniffed at.  It’s a tribute to  the massive  surgery  undertaken by chairman lan MacLaurin.
       For  the  small    chains   to keep up   with all  that   can     be tricky. Just like  the majors, they  have to    open
    superstores      and  invest    in computers  to  be   sure    of    generating growth     and    keeping margins     moving
    upwards. But being smaller         means the timing of investment and     return       has  got to be just right if both the
profit and loss account and the balance sheet aren’t to suffer. There is little room for mistakes... .
   .... Not that Hillards has made some obvious mistake. Rather, it trod too cautiously in the early eighties,
    investing only £24.0mft in fixed assets in the three     years       to       1983-4, against £29.1m in the two subsequent
    years.   That kept profits moving ahead nicely     until          1983-4. But rates of profits growth fell off after that.
    Hillards didn’t have enough        new stores opening  to counter     competition in its Yorkshire heartland     from  the
majors.
  What’s more, the grocer’s relative slowness at developing new systems and introducing more own
    label and fresh foods meant that profits        per square     foot and cash generation     never      covered the cost of
    expansion. The accelerated investment           programme         of recent years      led to the £15.7m preference rights
    issue in  February....
       ....  The attractions     are   obvious. The five   major      grocery retailers    are rapidly covering  the land with
    superstores,     taking market share each   year  from the Co-ops and the independents. With     a     decade     at  most
of expansion to go, the competition for suitable sites is intense.
  Buying Hillards’ 15 odd superstores will plug a gap in Tesco’s supermarket network. It will probably be
    cheaper, and certainly quicker, than for Tesco   to     set          up from scratch.  The takeover would imply   a little
    pro  forma earnings dilution. But Tesco reckons that the boost to sales     per square           foot that will follow the
metamorphosis of Hillards into Tesco (only a three month job) could even enhance earnings... .




    *Tesco figures
    tHillards’ accounts
THE INVESTORS CHRONICLE
Ist MAY, 1987




Being a small grocer isn't easy. Expansion costs a fortune and makes the company vulnerable to the site
hungry majors

Tesco closes in on Hillards

'Hillards not for sale" are the brave words on the red rosette of Mr Peter Hartley, chairman of the Yorkshire
grocer. Mr Hartley's defiance is unlikely to amount to much however. He has characterised Tesco's second
offer for Hillards as a "derisory discount', and points to the near third of the equity in friendly hands.
Nevertheless, only a miracle will save Hillards now.
Tesco's first 13 for 20 offer valued the Yorkshire grocer at £185m with Tesco at 496p, and might even
have carried the day if only Hillards hadn't come up with an unexpectedly impressive second profits
forecast: a 45 per cent. increase to £15m before tax in 1987-8.(Just how good this would be is indicated
by the fact that brokers Scrimgeour Vickers doubt that this rate of growth could have been sustained.)
The second offer, 14 for 19, and seven Tesco shares for 19 of the recently issued Hillards Convertible
Preference with a 342.6p cash alternative, means Hillards will cost Tesco £209m. That implies a prospective
PE of 21 on the 1987-8estimate.

Probably more important to Hillards' mainly institutional holders, the bid values the shares at 365p,
60 per cent. higher than the price just before Tesco came in. The lacklustre performance of Hillards'
shares over the last twelve months suggests the grocer could inspire nothing so good on its own.
It's not that Hillards' record is awful. Just uninspiring. And that it has been unable latterly to put on
extra volume in older supermarkets is perceived as worrying.
Being a small supermarket chain, after all, isn't easy. The market has become increasingly concentrated
in the hands of five majors over the last 10 years - Asda, Sainsbury, Argyll, Dee and of course Tesco. At
the same time, grocery retailing has become a lot more sophisticated. And the best example of the changes
just happens to be Tesco's transformation since the late seventies. It reads like the food retailer's credo.
From722* stores in 1977,many small and dingy, Tesco has shrunk to a 337-strong chain. But selling space
hasn't been reduced anything like as dramatically because115 of Tesco's outlets are 25,000square feet-plus
superstores. The product range, overgrown and often organised locally just before the turn of the decade,
was taken to the centre and rationalised. That paved the way for buying efficiencies, proper stock control
and more centralised distribution. And for the introduction of a higher proportion of lucrative own label
and fresh foods. The chinese lettuces have begun to draw in the too.

After the plateau of the late seventies, Tesco's profits started creeping upwards as a result. From£42.7m
before tax in the year to February1982, they have climbed to the£169m before property gains announced
last week, 38 per cent. higher than1985-86. Turnover last year was £3.81bn (£3.56bn).
Tesco has benefited from issues of equity and unsecured loan stock over the last two years. But the one
percentage point increase in 1986-87 net margins . . . . capping 5 years of steady improvement, is not to be
sniffed at. It's a tribute to the massive surgery undertaken by chairman lan MacLaurin.
For the small chains to keep up with all that can be tricky. Just like the majors, they have to open
superstores and invest in computers to be sure of generating growth and keeping margins moving
upwards. But being smaller means the timing of investment and return has got to be just right if both the
profit and loss account and the balance sheet aren't to suffer. There is little room for mistakes... .
.... Not that Hillards has made some obvious mistake. Rather, it trod too cautiously in the early eighties,
investing only £24.0mft in fixed assets in the three years to 1983-4,against £29.1m in the two subsequent
years. That kept profits moving ahead nicely until1983-4. But rates of profits growth fell off after that.
Hillards didn't have enough new stores opening to counter competition in its Yorkshire heartland from the
majors.
What's more, the grocer's relative slowness at developing new systems and introducing more own
label and fresh foods meant that profits per square foot and cash generation never covered the cost of
expansion. The accelerated investment programme of recent years led to the£15.7m preference rights
issue in February....
.... The attractions are obvious. The five major grocery retailers are rapidly covering the land with
superstores, taking market share each year from the Co-ops and the independents. With a decade at most
of expansion togo, the competition for suitable sites is intense.
Buying Hillards' 15 odd superstores will plug a gap in Tesco's supermarket network. It will probably be
cheaper, and certainly quicker, than for Tesco to set up from scratch. The takeover would imply a little
proforma earnings dilution. But Tesco reckons that the boost to sales per square foot that will follow the
metamorphosis of Hillards into Tesco (only a three month job) could even enhance earnings... .




*Tesco figures
tHillards' accounts

Read by machine, contrast corrected highest quality of the three

    THE INVESTORS CHRONICLE
    Ist MAY, 1987




    Being    a small  grocer isn’t    easy. Expansion costs    a fortune and makes the         company   vulnerable  to the site
    hungry majors

                                                 Tesco closes in      on     Hillards

 ‘Hillards not for sale” are the brave words on the red rosette of Mr Peter Hartley, chairman of the Yorkshire
 grocer. Mr Hartley’s defiance is unlikely to amount to much however. He has characterised Tesco’s second
    offer    for Hillards as a “derisory      discount’,  and points  to the    near third     of the equity  in friendly  hands.
    Nevertheless,     only a miracle will   save   Hillards now.
        Tesco’s first  13 for 20 offer valued the Yorkshire     grocer   at     £185m with Tesco     at  496p, and might     even
    have carried     the  day  if   only Hillards  hadn’t   come up   with     an unexpectedly     impressive      second profits
    forecast:    a 45  per cent.    increase to £15m before tax in              1987-8. (Just how good this would be is indicated
    by the fact that     brokers Scrimgeour Vickers doubt that        this     rate         of growth could have been sustained.)
        The second offer,    14 for   19, and   seven    Tesco shares for          19 of the recently issued Hillards Convertible
    Preference with     a  342.6p cash alternative,   means    Hillards will  cost Tesco £209m.    That implies  a    prospective
    PE               of 21 on  the      1987-8 estimate.

        Probably     more  important to Hillards’ mainly     institutional            holders, the bid values the shares at 365p,
    60   per   cent.  higher than the price just     before Tesco     came     in. The lacklustre        performance of Hillards’
shares over the last twelve months suggests the grocer could inspire nothing so good on its own.
        It’s not that  Hillards’    record is awful. Just  uninspiring. And that     it    has been unable latterly to put     on
    extra volume     in   older supermarkets is perceived     as      worrying.
        Being  a small supermarket chain, after all,     isn’t easy.              The market has become increasingly concentrated
    in  the hands of five majors      over  the last  10  years  - Asda, Sainsbury, Argyll,     Dee and of    course    Tesco. At
    the  same    time, grocery   retailing has become    a lot more            sophisticated. And the best example of the changes
    just happens     to   be Tesco’s transformation since the late seventies.          It  reads like  the food retailer’s credo.
        From 722* stores in 1977,     many   small and dingy, Tesco has shrunk to          a  337-strong chain. But selling space
    hasn’t been reduced anything like     as    dramatically because 115 of Tesco’s outlets     are   25,000  square    feet-plus
    superstores.     The product      range, overgrown            and often organised locally just before the turn of the decade,
    was  taken   to   the centre    and rationalised. That paved      the way   for buying efficiencies, proper     stock control
    and  more    centralised distribution.   And for the introduction of     a     higher    proportion of lucrative own    label
    and fresh    foods. The chinese lettuces have begun to draw in the                         too.

        After the plateau of the late seventies, Tesco’s profits started creeping upwards      as     a  result.     From £42.7m
    before   tax in   the year to   February 1982, they have climbed to the £169m before property                 gains announced
    last week, 38     per  cent.    higher than 1985-86. Turnover last           year was  £3.81bn  (£3.56bn).
        Tesco has benefited from issues of equity and unsecured loan stock                 over the last two years. But the  one
    percentage point     increase in  1986-87   net   margins  . . .  .  capping 5  years    of steady improvement, is not to be
    sniffed at.  It’s a tribute to  the massive  surgery  undertaken by chairman lan MacLaurin.
       For  the  small    chains   to keep  up  with all  that   can     be tricky. Just like  the majors, they  have to    open
    superstores      and  invest    in computers   to be    sure   of    generating growth     and    keeping margins     moving
    upwards. But being smaller         means the timing of investment and     return       has  got to be just right if both the
profit and loss account and the balance sheet aren’t to suffer. There is little room for mistakes... .
   .... Not that Hillards has made some obvious mistake. Rather, it trod too cautiously in the early eighties,
    investing only £24.0mft in fixed assets in the three     years       to       1983-4, against £29.1m in the two subsequent
    years.   That kept profits moving ahead nicely     until          1983-4. But rates of profits growth fell off after that.
    Hillards didn’t have enough        new  stores opening  to counter     competition in its Yorkshire heartland     from the
majors.
  What’s more, the grocer’s relative slowness at developing new systems and introducing more own
    label and fresh foods meant that profits        per square     foot and cash generation     never      covered the cost of
    expansion. The accelerated investment           programme         of recent years      led to the £15.7m preference rights
    issue in   February....
       ....  The attractions     are   obvious. The five   major      grocery retailers    are rapidly covering  the land with
    superstores,     taking market share each   year  from the Co-ops and the independents. With     a     decade     at  most
of expansion to go, the competition for suitable sites is intense.
  Buying Hillards’ 15 odd superstores will plug a gap in Tesco’s supermarket network. It will probably be
    cheaper, and certainly quicker, than for Tesco   to     set          up from scratch.  The takeover would imply   a little
    pro  forma earnings dilution. But Tesco reckons that the boost to sales     per square           foot that will follow the
metamorphosis of Hillards into Tesco (only a three month job) could even enhance earnings ....




    *Tesco figures
    tHillards’ accounts
THE INVESTORS CHRONICLE
Ist MAY, 1987




Being a small grocer isn't easy. Expansion costs a fortune and makes the company vulnerable to the site
hungry majors

Tesco closes in on Hillards

'Hillards not for sale" are the brave words on the red rosette of Mr Peter Hartley, chairman of the Yorkshire
grocer. Mr Hartley's defiance is unlikely to amount to much however. He has characterised Tesco's second
offer for Hillards as a "derisory discount', and points to the near third of the equity in friendly hands.
Nevertheless, only a miracle will save Hillards now.
Tesco's first 13 for 20 offer valued the Yorkshire grocer at £185m with Tesco at 496p, and might even
have carried the day if only Hillards hadn't come up with an unexpectedly impressive second profits
forecast: a 45 per cent. increase to £15m before tax in 1987-8.(Just how good this would be is indicated
by the fact that brokers Scrimgeour Vickers doubt that this rate of growth could have been sustained.)
The second offer, 14 for 19, and seven Tesco shares for 19 of the recently issued Hillards Convertible
Preference with a 342.6p cash alternative, means Hillards will cost Tesco £209m. That implies a prospective
PE of 21 on the 1987-8estimate.

Probably more important to Hillards' mainly institutional holders, the bid values the shares at 365p,
60 per cent. higher than the price just before Tesco came in. The lacklustre performance of Hillards'
shares over the last twelve months suggests the grocer could inspire nothing so good on its own.
It's not that Hillards' record is awful. Just uninspiring. And that it has been unable latterly to put on
extra volume in older supermarkets is perceived as worrying.
Being a small supermarket chain, after all, isn't easy. The market has become increasingly concentrated
in the hands of five majors over the last 10 years - Asda, Sainsbury, Argyll, Dee and of course Tesco. At
the same time, grocery retailing has become a lot more sophisticated. And the best example of the changes
just happens to be Tesco's transformation since the late seventies. It reads like the food retailer's credo.
From722* stores in 1977,many small and dingy, Tesco has shrunk to a 337-strong chain. But selling space
hasn't been reduced anything like as dramatically because115 of Tesco's outlets are 25,000square feet-plus
superstores. The product range, overgrown and often organised locally just before the turn of the decade,
was taken to the centre and rationalised. That paved the way for buying efficiencies, proper stock control
and more centralised distribution. And for the introduction of a higher proportion of lucrative own label
and fresh foods. The chinese lettuces have begun to draw in the too.

After the plateau of the late seventies, Tesco's profits started creeping upwards as a result. From£42.7m
before tax in the year to February1982, they have climbed to the£169m before property gains announced
last week, 38 per cent. higher than1985-86. Turnover last year was £3.81bn (£3.56bn).
Tesco has benefited from issues of equity and unsecured loan stock over the last two years. But the one
percentage point increase in 1986-87 net margins . . . . capping 5 years of steady improvement, is not to be
sniffed at. It's a tribute to the massive surgery undertaken by chairman lan MacLaurin.
For the small chains to keep up with all that can be tricky. Just like the majors, they have to open
superstores and invest in computers to be sure of generating growth and keeping margins moving
upwards. But being smaller means the timing of investment and return has got to be just right if both the
profit and loss account and the balance sheet aren't to suffer. There is little room for mistakes... .
.... Not that Hillards has made some obvious mistake. Rather, it trod too cautiously in the early eighties,
investing only £24.0mft in fixed assets in the three years to 1983-4,against £29.1m in the two subsequent
years. That kept profits moving ahead nicely until1983-4. But rates of profits growth fell off after that.
Hillards didn't have enough new stores opening to counter competition in its Yorkshire heartland from the
majors.
What's more, the grocer's relative slowness at developing new systems and introducing more own
label and fresh foods meant that profits per square foot and cash generation never covered the cost of
expansion. The accelerated investment programme of recent years led to the£15.7m preference rights
issue in February....
.... The attractions are obvious. The five major grocery retailers are rapidly covering the land with
superstores, taking market share each year from the Co-ops and the independents. With a decade at most
of expansion togo, the competition for suitable sites is intense.
Buying Hillards' 15 odd superstores will plug a gap in Tesco's supermarket network. It will probably be
cheaper, and certainly quicker, than for Tesco to set up from scratch. The takeover would imply a little
proforma earnings dilution. But Tesco reckons that the boost to sales per square foot that will follow the
metamorphosis of Hillards into Tesco (only a three month job) could even enhance earnings....




*Tesco figures
tHillards' accounts