Letter and information from Ian MacLaurin Chairman of Tesco to shareholders of Hilards page 3 of 6 previous next
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T H E I N V E S T O R S C H R O N I C L E
1st MAY, 1987
Being a small grocer Isn't easy. Expansion costs a fortune and makes the company vuinerable to the site
hungry majors
Te s c o c l o s e s i n o n H l l l a r d s
"Hillards not for sale" are the brave words on the red rosette of Mr Peter Hartley, chairman of the Yorkshire
grocer. Mr Hartley's defiance is unlikely to amount to much however. He has characterised Tesco's second
offer for Hillards as a "derisory discount", and points to the near third of the equity in friendly hands.
Nevertheless, only a miracle will save Hillards now.
Tesco's first 13 for 20 offer valued the Yorkshire grocer at £185m with Tesco at 496p, and might even
have carried the day if only Hillards hadn't come up with an unexpectedly impressive second profits
forecast: a 45 per cent, increase to £15m before tax in 1987-8. (Just how good this would be is indicated
by the fact that brokers Scrimgeour Vickers doubt that this rate of growth could have been sustained.)
The second offer, 14 for 19, and seven Tesco shares for 19 of the recently issued Hillards Convertible
Preference with a 342.6p cash alternative, means Hillards will cost Tesco £209m. That implies a prospective
P E r a t io . . . . o f 2 1 o n t h e 1 9 8 7 - 8 e s t i m a t e .
Probably more important to Hillards' mainly institutional holders, the bid values the shares at 365p,
60 per cent, higher than the price just before Tesco came in. The lacklustre performance of Hillards'
shares over the last twelve months suggests the grocer could inspire nothing so good on its own.
It's not that Hillards' record is awful. Just uninspiring. And that it has been unable latterly to put on
extra volume in older supermarkets is perceived as worrying.
Being a small supermarket chain, after all, isn't easy. The market has become increasingly concentrated
in the hands of five majors over the last 10 years - Asda, Sainsbury, Argyll, Dee and of course Tesco. At
the same time, grocery retailing has become a lot more sophisticated. And the best example of the changes
just happens to be Tesco's transformation since the late seventies. It reads like the food retailer's credo.
From 722* stores in 1977, many small and dingy, Tesco has shrunk to a 337-strong chain. But selling space
hasn't been reduced anything like as dramatically because 115 of Tesco's outlets are 25,000 square feet-plus
superstores. The product range, overgrown and often organised locally just before the turn of the decade,
was taken to the centre and rationalised. That paved the way for buying efficiencies, proper stock control
and more centralised distribution. And for the introduction of a higher proportion of lucrative own label
and fresh foods. The Chinese lettuces have begun to draw in the ABCIs too.
After the plateau of the late seventies, Tesco's profits started creeping upwards as a result. From £42.7m
before tax in the year to February 1982, they have climbed to the £169m before property gains announced
last week, 38 per cent, higher than 1985-86. Turnover last year was £3.81bn (£3.56bn).
Tesco has benefited from issues of equity and unsecured loan stock over the last two years. But the one
percentage point increase in 1986-87 net margins .... capping 5 years of steady improvement, is not to be
sniffed at. It's a tribute to the massive surgery undertaken by chairman Ian MacLaurin.
For the small chains to keep up with all that can be tricky, just like the majors, they have to open
superstores and invest in computers to be sure of generating growth and keeping margins moving
upwards. But being smaller means the timing of investment and return has got to be just right if both the
profit and loss account and the balance sheet aren't to suffer. There is little room for mistakes....
Not that Hillards has made some obvious mistake. Rather, it trod too cautiously in the early eighties,
investing only £24.0mt in fixed assets in the three years to 1983-4, against £29.1m in the two subsequent
years. That kept profits moving ahead nicely until 1983-4. But rates of profits growth fell off after that.
Hillards didn't have enough new stores opening to counter competition in its Yorkshire heartland from the
majors.
What's more, the grocer's relative slowness at developing new systems and introducing more own
label and fresh foods meant that profits per square foot and cash generation never covered the cost of
expansion. The accelerated investment programme of recent years led to the £15.7m preference rights
issue in February
.... The attractions are obvious. The five major grocery retailers are rapidly covering the land with
superstores, taking market share each year from the Co-ops and the independents. With a decade at most
of expansion to go, the competition for suitable sites is intense.
Buying Hillards' 15 odd superstores will plug a gap in Tesco's supermarket network. It will probably be
cheaper, and certainly quicker, than for Tesco to set up from scratch. The takeover would imply a little
pro forma earnings dilution. But Tesco reckons that the boost to sales per square foot that will follow the
metamorphosis of Hillards into Tesco (only a three month job) could even enhance earnings....
•Tesco figures
tHillards' accountsTHEINVESTORSCHRONICLE 1st MAY, 1987 Being a small grocer Isn't easy. Expansion costs a fortune and makes the company vuinerable to the site hungry majors Te scoclosesinonHlllards "Hillards not for sale" are the brave words on the red rosette of Mr Peter Hartley, chairman of the Yorkshire grocer. Mr Hartley's defiance is unlikely to amount to much however. He has characterised Tesco's second offer for Hillards as a "derisory discount", and points to the near third of the equity in friendly hands. Nevertheless, only a miracle will save Hillards now. Tesco's first 13 for 20 offer valued the Yorkshire grocer at £185m with Tesco at 496p, and might even have carried the day if only Hillards hadn't come up with an unexpectedly impressive second profits forecast: a 45 per cent, increase to £15m before tax in 1987-8.(Just how good this would be is indicated by the fact that brokers Scrimgeour Vickers doubt that this rate of growth could have been sustained.) The second offer, 14 for 19, and seven Tesco shares for 19 of the recently issued Hillards Convertible Preference with a 342.6p cash alternative, means Hillards will cost Tesco £209m. That implies a prospective PErat io . . . . of21onthe1987 - 8estimate . Probably more important to Hillards' mainly institutional holders, the bid values the shares at 365p, 60 per cent, higher than the price just before Tesco came in. The lacklustre performance of Hillards' shares over the last twelve months suggests the grocer could inspire nothing so good on its own. It's not that Hillards' record is awful. Just uninspiring. And that it has been unable latterly to put on extra volume in older supermarkets is perceived as worrying. Being a small supermarket chain, after all, isn't easy. The market has become increasingly concentrated in the hands of five majors over the last 10 years - Asda, Sainsbury, Argyll, Dee and of course Tesco. At the same time, grocery retailing has become a lot more sophisticated. And the best example of the changes just happens to be Tesco's transformation since the late seventies. It reads like the food retailer's credo. From722* stores in 1977,many small and dingy, Tesco has shrunk to a 337-strong chain. But selling space hasn't been reduced anything like as dramatically because115 of Tesco's outlets are 25,000square feet-plus superstores. The product range, overgrown and often organised locally just before the turn of the decade, was taken to the centre and rationalised. That paved the way for buying efficiencies, proper stock control and more centralised distribution. And for the introduction of a higher proportion of lucrative own label and fresh foods. The Chinese lettuces have begun to draw in the ABCIs too. After the plateau of the late seventies, Tesco's profits started creeping upwards as a result. From£42.7m before tax in the year to February1982, they have climbed to the£169m before property gains announced last week, 38 per cent, higher than1985-86. Turnover last year was £3.81bn (£3.56bn). Tesco has benefited from issues of equity and unsecured loan stock over the last two years. But the one percentage point increase in 1986-87 net margins.... capping 5 years of steady improvement, is not to be sniffed at. It's a tribute to the massive surgery undertaken by chairman Ian MacLaurin. For the small chains to keep up with all that can be tricky, just like the majors, they have to open superstores and invest in computers to be sure of generating growth and keeping margins moving upwards. But being smaller means the timing of investment and return has got to be just right if both the profit and loss account and the balance sheet aren't to suffer. There is little room for mistakes.... Not that Hillards has made some obvious mistake. Rather, it trod too cautiously in the early eighties, investing only £24.0mt in fixed assets in the three years to 1983-4,against £29.1m in the two subsequent years. That kept profits moving ahead nicely until1983-4. But rates of profits growth fell off after that. Hillards didn't have enough new stores opening to counter competition in its Yorkshire heartland from the majors. What's more, the grocer's relative slowness at developing new systems and introducing more own label and fresh foods meant that profits per square foot and cash generation never covered the cost of expansion. The accelerated investment programme of recent years led to the£15.7m preference rights issue in February .... The attractions are obvious. The five major grocery retailers are rapidly covering the land with superstores, taking market share each year from the Co-ops and the independents. With a decade at most of expansion togo, the competition for suitable sites is intense. Buying Hillards' 15 odd superstores will plug a gap in Tesco's supermarket network. It will probably be cheaper, and certainly quicker, than for Tesco to set up from scratch. The takeover would imply a little proforma earnings dilution. But Tesco reckons that the boost to sales per square foot that will follow the metamorphosis of Hillards into Tesco (only a three month job) could even enhance earnings.... •Tesco figures tHillards' accounts
Read by machine
THE INVESTORS CHRONICLE
Ist MAY, 1987
Being a small grocer isn’t easy. Expansion costs a fortune and makes the company vulnerable to the site
hungry majors
Tesco closes in on Hillards
‘Hillards not for sale” are the brave words on the red rosette of Mr Peter Hartley, chairman of the Yorkshire
grocer. Mr Hartley’s defiance is unlikely to amount to much however. He has characterised Tesco’s second
offer for Hillards as a “derisory discount’, and points to the near third of the equity in friendly hands.
Nevertheless, only a miracle will save Hillards now.
Tesco’s first 13 for 20 offer valued the Yorkshire grocer at £185m with Tesco at 496p, and might even
have carried the day if only Hillards hadn’t come up with an unexpectedly impressive second profits
forecast: a 45 per cent. increase to £15m before tax in 1987-8. (Just how good this would be is indicated
by the fact that brokers Scrimgeour Vickers doubt that this rate of growth could have been sustained.)
The second offer, 14 for 19, and seven Tesco shares for 19 of the recently issued Hillards Convertible
Preference with a 342.6p cash alternative, means Hillards will cost Tesco £209m. That implies a prospective
PE of 21 on the 1987-8 estimate.
Probably more important to Hillards’ mainly institutional holders, the bid values the shares at 365p,
60 per cent. higher than the price just before Tesco came in. The lacklustre performance of Hillards’
shares over the last twelve months suggests the grocer could inspire nothing so good on its own.
It’s not that Hillards’ record is awful. Just uninspiring. And that it has been unable latterly to put on
extra volume in older supermarkets is perceived as worrying.
Being a small supermarket chain, after all, isn’t easy. The market has become increasingly concentrated
in the hands of five majors over the last 10 years - Asda, Sainsbury, Argyll, Dee and of course Tesco. At
the same time, grocery retailing has become a lot more sophisticated. And the best example of the changes
just happens to be Tesco’s transformation since the late seventies. It reads like the food retailer’s credo.
From 722* stores in 1977, many small and dingy, Tesco has shrunk to a 337-strong chain. But selling space
hasn’t been reduced anything like as dramatically because 115 of Tesco’s outlets are 25,000 square feet-plus
superstores. The product range, overgrown and often organised locally just before the turn of the decade,
was taken to the centre and rationalised. That paved the way for buying efficiencies, proper stock control
and more centralised distribution. And for the introduction of a higher proportion of lucrative own label
and fresh foods. The chinese lettuces have begun to draw in the too.
After the plateau of the late seventies, Tesco’s profits started creeping upwards as a result. From £42.7m
before tax in the year to February 1982, they have climbed to the £169m before property gains announced
last week, 38 per cent. higher than 1985-86. Turnover last year was £3.81bn (£3.56bn).
Tesco has benefited from issues of equity and unsecured loan stock over the last two years. But the one
percentage point increase in 1986-87 net margins . . . . capping 5 years of steady improvement, is not to be
sniffed at. It’s a tribute to the massive surgery undertaken by chairman lan MacLaurin.
For the small chains to keep up with all that can be tricky. Just like the majors, they have to open
superstores and invest in computers to be sure of generating growth and keeping margins moving
upwards. But being smaller means the timing of investment and return has got to be just right if both the
profit and loss account and the balance sheet aren’t to suffer. There is little room for mistakes... .
.... Not that Hillards has made some obvious mistake. Rather, it trod too cautiously in the early eighties,
investing only £24.0mft in fixed assets in the three years to 1983-4, against £29.1m in the two subsequent
years. That kept profits moving ahead nicely until 1983-4. But rates of profits growth fell off after that.
Hillards didn’t have enough new stores opening to counter competition in its Yorkshire heartland from the
majors.
What’s more, the grocer’s relative slowness at developing new systems and introducing more own
label and fresh foods meant that profits per square foot and cash generation never covered the cost of
expansion. The accelerated investment programme of recent years led to the £15.7m preference rights
issue in February....
.... The attractions are obvious. The five major grocery retailers are rapidly covering the land with
superstores, taking market share each year from the Co-ops and the independents. With a decade at most
of expansion to go, the competition for suitable sites is intense.
Buying Hillards’ 15 odd superstores will plug a gap in Tesco’s supermarket network. It will probably be
cheaper, and certainly quicker, than for Tesco to set up from scratch. The takeover would imply a little
pro forma earnings dilution. But Tesco reckons that the boost to sales per square foot that will follow the
metamorphosis of Hillards into Tesco (only a three month job) could even enhance earnings... .
*Tesco figures
tHillards’ accountsTHE INVESTORS CHRONICLE Ist MAY, 1987 Being a small grocer isn't easy. Expansion costs a fortune and makes the company vulnerable to the site hungry majors Tesco closes in on Hillards 'Hillards not for sale" are the brave words on the red rosette of Mr Peter Hartley, chairman of the Yorkshire grocer. Mr Hartley's defiance is unlikely to amount to much however. He has characterised Tesco's second offer for Hillards as a "derisory discount', and points to the near third of the equity in friendly hands. Nevertheless, only a miracle will save Hillards now. Tesco's first 13 for 20 offer valued the Yorkshire grocer at £185m with Tesco at 496p, and might even have carried the day if only Hillards hadn't come up with an unexpectedly impressive second profits forecast: a 45 per cent. increase to £15m before tax in 1987-8.(Just how good this would be is indicated by the fact that brokers Scrimgeour Vickers doubt that this rate of growth could have been sustained.) The second offer, 14 for 19, and seven Tesco shares for 19 of the recently issued Hillards Convertible Preference with a 342.6p cash alternative, means Hillards will cost Tesco £209m. That implies a prospective PE of 21 on the 1987-8estimate. Probably more important to Hillards' mainly institutional holders, the bid values the shares at 365p, 60 per cent. higher than the price just before Tesco came in. The lacklustre performance of Hillards' shares over the last twelve months suggests the grocer could inspire nothing so good on its own. It's not that Hillards' record is awful. Just uninspiring. And that it has been unable latterly to put on extra volume in older supermarkets is perceived as worrying. Being a small supermarket chain, after all, isn't easy. The market has become increasingly concentrated in the hands of five majors over the last 10 years - Asda, Sainsbury, Argyll, Dee and of course Tesco. At the same time, grocery retailing has become a lot more sophisticated. And the best example of the changes just happens to be Tesco's transformation since the late seventies. It reads like the food retailer's credo. From722* stores in 1977,many small and dingy, Tesco has shrunk to a 337-strong chain. But selling space hasn't been reduced anything like as dramatically because115 of Tesco's outlets are 25,000square feet-plus superstores. The product range, overgrown and often organised locally just before the turn of the decade, was taken to the centre and rationalised. That paved the way for buying efficiencies, proper stock control and more centralised distribution. And for the introduction of a higher proportion of lucrative own label and fresh foods. The chinese lettuces have begun to draw in the too. After the plateau of the late seventies, Tesco's profits started creeping upwards as a result. From£42.7m before tax in the year to February1982, they have climbed to the£169m before property gains announced last week, 38 per cent. higher than1985-86. Turnover last year was £3.81bn (£3.56bn). Tesco has benefited from issues of equity and unsecured loan stock over the last two years. But the one percentage point increase in 1986-87 net margins . . . . capping 5 years of steady improvement, is not to be sniffed at. It's a tribute to the massive surgery undertaken by chairman lan MacLaurin. For the small chains to keep up with all that can be tricky. Just like the majors, they have to open superstores and invest in computers to be sure of generating growth and keeping margins moving upwards. But being smaller means the timing of investment and return has got to be just right if both the profit and loss account and the balance sheet aren't to suffer. There is little room for mistakes... . .... Not that Hillards has made some obvious mistake. Rather, it trod too cautiously in the early eighties, investing only £24.0mft in fixed assets in the three years to 1983-4,against £29.1m in the two subsequent years. That kept profits moving ahead nicely until1983-4. But rates of profits growth fell off after that. Hillards didn't have enough new stores opening to counter competition in its Yorkshire heartland from the majors. What's more, the grocer's relative slowness at developing new systems and introducing more own label and fresh foods meant that profits per square foot and cash generation never covered the cost of expansion. The accelerated investment programme of recent years led to the£15.7m preference rights issue in February.... .... The attractions are obvious. The five major grocery retailers are rapidly covering the land with superstores, taking market share each year from the Co-ops and the independents. With a decade at most of expansion togo, the competition for suitable sites is intense. Buying Hillards' 15 odd superstores will plug a gap in Tesco's supermarket network. It will probably be cheaper, and certainly quicker, than for Tesco to set up from scratch. The takeover would imply a little proforma earnings dilution. But Tesco reckons that the boost to sales per square foot that will follow the metamorphosis of Hillards into Tesco (only a three month job) could even enhance earnings... . *Tesco figures tHillards' accounts
Read by machine, contrast corrected highest quality of the three
THE INVESTORS CHRONICLE
Ist MAY, 1987
Being a small grocer isn’t easy. Expansion costs a fortune and makes the company vulnerable to the site
hungry majors
Tesco closes in on Hillards
‘Hillards not for sale” are the brave words on the red rosette of Mr Peter Hartley, chairman of the Yorkshire
grocer. Mr Hartley’s defiance is unlikely to amount to much however. He has characterised Tesco’s second
offer for Hillards as a “derisory discount’, and points to the near third of the equity in friendly hands.
Nevertheless, only a miracle will save Hillards now.
Tesco’s first 13 for 20 offer valued the Yorkshire grocer at £185m with Tesco at 496p, and might even
have carried the day if only Hillards hadn’t come up with an unexpectedly impressive second profits
forecast: a 45 per cent. increase to £15m before tax in 1987-8. (Just how good this would be is indicated
by the fact that brokers Scrimgeour Vickers doubt that this rate of growth could have been sustained.)
The second offer, 14 for 19, and seven Tesco shares for 19 of the recently issued Hillards Convertible
Preference with a 342.6p cash alternative, means Hillards will cost Tesco £209m. That implies a prospective
PE of 21 on the 1987-8 estimate.
Probably more important to Hillards’ mainly institutional holders, the bid values the shares at 365p,
60 per cent. higher than the price just before Tesco came in. The lacklustre performance of Hillards’
shares over the last twelve months suggests the grocer could inspire nothing so good on its own.
It’s not that Hillards’ record is awful. Just uninspiring. And that it has been unable latterly to put on
extra volume in older supermarkets is perceived as worrying.
Being a small supermarket chain, after all, isn’t easy. The market has become increasingly concentrated
in the hands of five majors over the last 10 years - Asda, Sainsbury, Argyll, Dee and of course Tesco. At
the same time, grocery retailing has become a lot more sophisticated. And the best example of the changes
just happens to be Tesco’s transformation since the late seventies. It reads like the food retailer’s credo.
From 722* stores in 1977, many small and dingy, Tesco has shrunk to a 337-strong chain. But selling space
hasn’t been reduced anything like as dramatically because 115 of Tesco’s outlets are 25,000 square feet-plus
superstores. The product range, overgrown and often organised locally just before the turn of the decade,
was taken to the centre and rationalised. That paved the way for buying efficiencies, proper stock control
and more centralised distribution. And for the introduction of a higher proportion of lucrative own label
and fresh foods. The chinese lettuces have begun to draw in the too.
After the plateau of the late seventies, Tesco’s profits started creeping upwards as a result. From £42.7m
before tax in the year to February 1982, they have climbed to the £169m before property gains announced
last week, 38 per cent. higher than 1985-86. Turnover last year was £3.81bn (£3.56bn).
Tesco has benefited from issues of equity and unsecured loan stock over the last two years. But the one
percentage point increase in 1986-87 net margins . . . . capping 5 years of steady improvement, is not to be
sniffed at. It’s a tribute to the massive surgery undertaken by chairman lan MacLaurin.
For the small chains to keep up with all that can be tricky. Just like the majors, they have to open
superstores and invest in computers to be sure of generating growth and keeping margins moving
upwards. But being smaller means the timing of investment and return has got to be just right if both the
profit and loss account and the balance sheet aren’t to suffer. There is little room for mistakes... .
.... Not that Hillards has made some obvious mistake. Rather, it trod too cautiously in the early eighties,
investing only £24.0mft in fixed assets in the three years to 1983-4, against £29.1m in the two subsequent
years. That kept profits moving ahead nicely until 1983-4. But rates of profits growth fell off after that.
Hillards didn’t have enough new stores opening to counter competition in its Yorkshire heartland from the
majors.
What’s more, the grocer’s relative slowness at developing new systems and introducing more own
label and fresh foods meant that profits per square foot and cash generation never covered the cost of
expansion. The accelerated investment programme of recent years led to the £15.7m preference rights
issue in February....
.... The attractions are obvious. The five major grocery retailers are rapidly covering the land with
superstores, taking market share each year from the Co-ops and the independents. With a decade at most
of expansion to go, the competition for suitable sites is intense.
Buying Hillards’ 15 odd superstores will plug a gap in Tesco’s supermarket network. It will probably be
cheaper, and certainly quicker, than for Tesco to set up from scratch. The takeover would imply a little
pro forma earnings dilution. But Tesco reckons that the boost to sales per square foot that will follow the
metamorphosis of Hillards into Tesco (only a three month job) could even enhance earnings ....
*Tesco figures
tHillards’ accountsTHE INVESTORS CHRONICLE Ist MAY, 1987 Being a small grocer isn't easy. Expansion costs a fortune and makes the company vulnerable to the site hungry majors Tesco closes in on Hillards 'Hillards not for sale" are the brave words on the red rosette of Mr Peter Hartley, chairman of the Yorkshire grocer. Mr Hartley's defiance is unlikely to amount to much however. He has characterised Tesco's second offer for Hillards as a "derisory discount', and points to the near third of the equity in friendly hands. Nevertheless, only a miracle will save Hillards now. Tesco's first 13 for 20 offer valued the Yorkshire grocer at £185m with Tesco at 496p, and might even have carried the day if only Hillards hadn't come up with an unexpectedly impressive second profits forecast: a 45 per cent. increase to £15m before tax in 1987-8.(Just how good this would be is indicated by the fact that brokers Scrimgeour Vickers doubt that this rate of growth could have been sustained.) The second offer, 14 for 19, and seven Tesco shares for 19 of the recently issued Hillards Convertible Preference with a 342.6p cash alternative, means Hillards will cost Tesco £209m. That implies a prospective PE of 21 on the 1987-8estimate. Probably more important to Hillards' mainly institutional holders, the bid values the shares at 365p, 60 per cent. higher than the price just before Tesco came in. The lacklustre performance of Hillards' shares over the last twelve months suggests the grocer could inspire nothing so good on its own. It's not that Hillards' record is awful. Just uninspiring. And that it has been unable latterly to put on extra volume in older supermarkets is perceived as worrying. Being a small supermarket chain, after all, isn't easy. The market has become increasingly concentrated in the hands of five majors over the last 10 years - Asda, Sainsbury, Argyll, Dee and of course Tesco. At the same time, grocery retailing has become a lot more sophisticated. And the best example of the changes just happens to be Tesco's transformation since the late seventies. It reads like the food retailer's credo. From722* stores in 1977,many small and dingy, Tesco has shrunk to a 337-strong chain. But selling space hasn't been reduced anything like as dramatically because115 of Tesco's outlets are 25,000square feet-plus superstores. The product range, overgrown and often organised locally just before the turn of the decade, was taken to the centre and rationalised. That paved the way for buying efficiencies, proper stock control and more centralised distribution. And for the introduction of a higher proportion of lucrative own label and fresh foods. The chinese lettuces have begun to draw in the too. After the plateau of the late seventies, Tesco's profits started creeping upwards as a result. From£42.7m before tax in the year to February1982, they have climbed to the£169m before property gains announced last week, 38 per cent. higher than1985-86. Turnover last year was £3.81bn (£3.56bn). Tesco has benefited from issues of equity and unsecured loan stock over the last two years. But the one percentage point increase in 1986-87 net margins . . . . capping 5 years of steady improvement, is not to be sniffed at. It's a tribute to the massive surgery undertaken by chairman lan MacLaurin. For the small chains to keep up with all that can be tricky. Just like the majors, they have to open superstores and invest in computers to be sure of generating growth and keeping margins moving upwards. But being smaller means the timing of investment and return has got to be just right if both the profit and loss account and the balance sheet aren't to suffer. There is little room for mistakes... . .... Not that Hillards has made some obvious mistake. Rather, it trod too cautiously in the early eighties, investing only £24.0mft in fixed assets in the three years to 1983-4,against £29.1m in the two subsequent years. That kept profits moving ahead nicely until1983-4. But rates of profits growth fell off after that. Hillards didn't have enough new stores opening to counter competition in its Yorkshire heartland from the majors. What's more, the grocer's relative slowness at developing new systems and introducing more own label and fresh foods meant that profits per square foot and cash generation never covered the cost of expansion. The accelerated investment programme of recent years led to the£15.7m preference rights issue in February.... .... The attractions are obvious. The five major grocery retailers are rapidly covering the land with superstores, taking market share each year from the Co-ops and the independents. With a decade at most of expansion togo, the competition for suitable sites is intense. Buying Hillards' 15 odd superstores will plug a gap in Tesco's supermarket network. It will probably be cheaper, and certainly quicker, than for Tesco to set up from scratch. The takeover would imply a little proforma earnings dilution. But Tesco reckons that the boost to sales per square foot that will follow the metamorphosis of Hillards into Tesco (only a three month job) could even enhance earnings.... *Tesco figures tHillards' accounts